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THE ‘ORIGINAL INTENT’ OF THE
FEDERAL TAX TREATMENT OF
PRIVATE PENSION PLANS
by James A. Wooten

James A. Wooten is Associate Professor at the
State University of New York at Buffalo School of
Law.
The Internal Revenue Code has long granted
distinctive tax treatment to retirement plans
sponsored by private employers. Wooten thinks
that most present-day commentators view the
provisions for qualified plans as a subsidy to encourage employers to provide deferred compensation. As this report explains, the policymakers
who devised these rules in the 1920s had a very
different purpose in mind. In its early years, the
income tax discriminated against deferred compensation by taxing it more heavily than wage
a n d s a la r y i n co m e. Woo t en b e li ev es t h at
policymakers developed special rules for retirement plans to eliminate this bias, rather than to
create a subsidy.
The author wishes to thank Guyora Binder,
Sharon Entress, Nell Hennessy, David Moss, Bill
Nelson, Gail Radford, Steven Sass, Schlegel,
Nancy Staudt, Norman Stein, Ed Zelinsky, and
Julian Zelizer for their comments and encouragem en t. Ea rlie r version s of t his article w ere
presented at the Legal History Colloquium at
New York University School of Law and at the
1997 Annual Conference of the Social Science History Association. The author’s archival research
was supported by a grant from the Olin Summer
Fellowship Program at Yale Law School.
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Since the 1920s, private pension plans financed
throug h employer contributions to a trust have
received distinctive treatment under the Internal Revenue Code.1 Employer contributions that fund a qualified retirement plan are deductible when the employer
makes them.2 Investment income of a qualified plan
accrues tax-free.3 Employees do not pay tax on employer contributions or trust income until they receive
benefits.4 In the context of the contemporary Internal
Revenue Code, the effect of these provisions is to tax
deferred compensation provided through a qualified
plan less heavily than wage and salary income. Consequently, an individual may reduce her lifetime tax burden (and federal revenues) by substituting deferred
compensation for wage and salary income.5
Commentators have argued for several decades
about how to characterize this bias toward deferred
compensation, but the o rthodox view is that qualified
p la n s re c ei ve a su bs idy or “t ax exp en dit ure. ”6
Proponents of the tax-subsidy theory hold that the
revenue-reducing features of the tax treatment of qualified plans are a departure from the prevailing conception of a normative income tax. For example, Bruce

1
See Nancy J. Altman, “Rethinking Retirement Income
Policies: Nondiscrimination, Integration, and the Quest for
Worker Security,” 42 Tax L. Rev. 433, 444-45 (1987).
2
Section 404(a)(1).
3
Section 501(a).
4
Section 402(a).
5
See Altman, supra note 1, at 445-46; see also Richard A.
Ippolito, Pensions, Economics, and Public Policy 16-26 (1986);
Norman P. Stein, “Qualified Plans and Tax Expenditures: A
Reply to Professor Zelinsky,” 9 Am. J. Tax Pol’y 225, 229-30
(1991).
6
See Public Policy and Private Pension Programs: A Report to
the President on Private Employee Retirement Plans 15-19 (1965).
See also Altman, supra note 1, at 436; Bruce Wolk, “Discrimination Rules for Qualified Retirement Plans: Good Intentions
Confront Economic Reality,” 70 Va. L. Rev. 419, 421-25 (1984);
Dan M. McGill, Kyle N. Brown, John J. Haley, and Sylvester
J. Schieber, Fundamentals of Private Pensions 115 (7th ed. 1997).
For contrary views, see Raymond Goetz, “The Myth of Special Tax Concessions for Qualified Pension Plans,” 51 Iowa L.
Rev. 561 (1966); Ray M. Peterson, “Surrey’s ‘Subsidy,’” 6 Pension and Welfare News 34 (1970); and Edward A. Zelinsky, “The
Tax Treatment of Qualified Plans: A Classic Defense of the
Status Quo,” 66 N.C. L. Rev. 315 (1988).
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Wolk argues that general tax principles would not
allow an employer to deduct contributions that fund
forfeitable pension accruals because such contributions
may benefit the employer by reducing contributions
for future liabilities.7 Contributions that fund nonforfeitable accruals, on the other hand, would be taxed to
the employee because they provide a current economic
benefit to the employee.8 General principles would
treat trust income in parallel fashion, taxing income
allocated to forfeitable accruals to the employer and
income allocated to vested obligations to the employee.9 These deviations from general tax principles
create a subsidy, it is argued, because, “[i]n effect, the
private sector is being permitted to allocate for business and personal goals money that would otherwise
have flowed into the federal treasury to be spent in
ways determined by Congress.” 10 Congress grants the
subsidy to induce employers to provide retirement income to employees.11

Commentators have argued for several
decades about how to characterize
this bias toward deferred
compensation, but the orthodox view
is that qualified plans receive a
subsidy or ‘tax expenditure.’
Most work on the history of private pension plans
assumes that plans have benefited from a subsidy since
policymakers adopted this tax treatment and that the
purpose of the subsidy is (and was) to induce firms to
create retirement plans. Beth Stevens writes, for example, that “[t]he premise [of the tax exemption of
pension trusts under the Revenue Act of 1926] was that
such a tax exemption would lead employers to regard
pensions as a mechanism for lowering their tax bills, as well
as for ensuring the welfare of their older workers.” 12
Likewise, Jill Quadagno and Melissa Hardy state that
“[t]he tax code encouraged firms to initiate pension plans
by allowing them to accumulate deferred contributions
tax free but forcing them to pay corporate taxes on
accumulations outside the plan.”13 More recently,
Christopher Howard contends that “[t]he preferential
tax treatment of employer pensions evolved incremen-

tally, first in administrative rulings and later in congressional statutes, between 1914 and 1926.” 14 Even
Nancy Altman, who argues that policy-makers did not
intend to create an incentive when they developed the
tax treatment of pension trusts, concedes that the tax
treatment did, as a matter of fact, constitute a subsidy.
She argues, however, that policy-makers may have considered the subsidy an ex post reward to firms that
already maintained pension plans rather than an ex
ante inducement to create plans.15
A closer examination of the historical record suggests a very different story. The policy-makers who
developed the distinctive tax treatment of private pension plans were not concerned with encouraging employers to create retirement plans or with rewarding
firms that did so. Rather than providing a benefit,
policymakers meant to eliminate a bias. In the early
years of the income tax, the Internal Revenue Code
taxed deferred compensation more heavily than wage
and salary income. The discriminatory effect was particularly clear in cases in which an employer financed
its pension obligations through a trust. Congress
adopted a new tax treatment of pension trusts after tax
experts concluded that the code’s bias against deferred
compensation impeded efforts by employers to finance
retirement plans in a responsible fashion. The adoption
of today’s rules, then, was not perceived to be a preferential departure from neutral taxation. On the contrary, it was and was perceived to be a step toward
more neutral taxation of deferred compensation.

I. The Era of Pay-As-You-Go Pensioning
Tax law is central to c ontemporary thinking about
private pension plans. According to economist Alicia
Munnell, “The federal income tax laws have been instrumental in both encouraging the growth of private
p e n s i o n p la n s a n d i n f lu e n ci n g t h e w ay th e y
developed.”16 Of course, tax law is central to the
management and administration of pension plans.
Most law practice in the field of pensions is tax practice.17 Programs offered by professional groups focus
on tax law, and the first casebook on ERISA, Langbein
and Wolk’s Pension and Employee Benefit Law, devotes
about 200 of its 660 pages to tax issues.18
The ubiquity of tax issues in today’s private pension
system is in marked contrast to the early literature on

7

See Wolk, supra note 6, at 422.
See id. at 422-24. See also section 83(a).
9
See Wolk, supra note 6, at 424-25.
10
McGill et al., supra note 6, at 115.
11
See id. See also Altman, supra note 1, at 436; Wolk, supra
note 6, at 419.
12
Beth Stevens, “Blurring the Boundaries: How the Federal
Government Has Influenced Welfare Benefits in the Private
Sector,” in The Politics of Social Policy in the United States 123,
128 (Margaret Weir, et al. eds., 1988) (italics added).
13
Jill Quadagno and Melissa Hardy, “Private Pensions,
State Regulation and Income Security for Older Workers: The
U.S. Auto Industry,” in The Privatization of Social Policy? Occupational Welfare and the Welfare State in America, Scandinavia
and Japan 136, 138 (Michael Shalev, ed., 1996) (italics added).
8
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14
Christopher Howard, The Hidden Welfare State: Tax Expenditures and Social Policy in the United States 55 (1997) (italics
added).
15
See Altman, supra note 1, at 450.
16
Alicia H. Munnell, The Economics of Private Pensions 30
(1982). See also Ippolito, supra note 5, at 16.
17
Thus, comprehensive looseleaf publications on pension
plans devote a large share of their pages to tax issues. See
Research Institute of America, Pension and Profit Sharing (1999);
see also Commerce Clearing House, Pension Plan Guide (1999).
18
American Law Institute, Basic Law of Pensions, Welfare
Plans, and Deferred Compensation (1995) (ALI/ABA course of
study materials); see also John H. Langbein and Bruce A.
Wolk, Pensions and Employee Benefit Law 120-321 (1990).
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“industrial pensions.” Early accounts make only passing reference to tax law if they address it at all. Luther
Conant’s A Critical Analysis of Industrial Pension Systems, published in 1922, and the National Industrial
Conference Board’s 1925 study of Industrial Pensions in
the United States are silent.19 Only five pages of Murray
Latimer’s huge study, Industrial Pension Systems, discuss federal income tax laws.20 And as a later commentator observed, Latimer gave “no indication . . . that
[the provisions of the 1928 Revenue Act and related
regulations] were having any noticeable influence on
the development of retirement plans.” 21
There is little discussion of tax law in early studies
because employers did not adopt the first pension
plans in response to financial incentives of the tax laws.
Businesses created the earliest pension arrangements
to address personnel problems that arose in the operation of large, complex business enterprises.22 Managers
in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries
saw the practice of pensioning aged employees as an
apparently simple and effective response to a difficult
and increasingly common dilemma — “the question of
what to do with the worn-out worker.”23
This dilemma was a consequence of fundamental
changes in the post-Civil War economy. In the last
decades of the nineteenth century, the development of
high-throughput production methods contributed to
the creation of long-lived, large-scale enterprises in
which stages of the production process were tightly
interdependent.24 As Steven Sass writes of railroading,
“The services provided by all these employees were
essentially complementary, with the output of any one
worker tied closely to the output of co-workers, and
with limited ability to substitute the labor of one for
another.”25 These new circumstances led managers to
conceive and manage the employment relationship in

19
See Luther Conant, Jr., A Critical Analysis of Industrial Pension Systems (1922); National Industrial Conference Board, Industrial Pensions in the United States (1925).
20
Murray Webb Latimer, 2 Industrial Pension Systems in the
United States and Canada 660-64 (1932).
21
Rainard B. Robbins, Impact of Taxes on Industrial Pension
Plans 6 (1949); Robbins also notes that there is no discussion
of tax issues in the National Industrial Conference Board
report. See id. at 4.
22
See Steven A. Sass, The Promise of Private Pensions 13-14,
18-37 (1997); see also Carol Haber and Brian Gratton, Old Age
and the Search for Security 106-09 (1994); Roger L. Ransom,
Richard Sutch, and Samuel H. Williamson, “Inventing Pensions: The Origins of the Company-Provided Pension in the
United States 1900-1940” in Societal Impact on Aging: Historical
Perspectives 1, 11-16 (K. Warner Schaie and W. Andrew Achenbaum, eds., 1993).
23
Abraham Epstein, “Industrial and Commercial Pensions
in the United States” in Selected Articles on Old Age Pensions
47, 56 (Lamar T. Beman, ed., 1927).
24
See Sass, supra note 22, at 28-30; see also Alfred D.
Chandler, The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in
American Business 240-83 (1977); Ransom et al., supra note 22,
at 11.
25
Sass, supra note 22, at 29.
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new ways.26 High-speed, closely coordinated production processes made stability of employment a critical
factor in production. Firms responded by adopting
new strategies of person nel administration that
rewarded workers for long service. Seniority emerged
as th e source of internal hierarchy as businesses
“replaced short-term [employment] contracts with implicit long-term ones.”27

The ubiquity of tax issues in today’s
private pension system is in marked
contrast to the early literature on
‘industrial pensions.’ Early accounts
make only passing reference to tax law
if they address it at all.
But seniority systems created their own personnel
problems. As a firm’s workforce aged, managers found
themselves with older workers whose capacities were
declining as a result of superannuation. The same factors that made stable employment important increased
the harm that might be done by superannuated employees. As Sass puts it, “One inefficient man . . .
degraded an entire group’s performance.” 28 Furthermore, the steadily increasing earnings that a seniority
system provided to long-service employees eventually
made even able workers expensive for a firm to maintain.29 Yet these “inefficient” workers often had contributed many years of service and needed their wages
to survive.30
Confronted with this uncomfortable situation, some
businesses granted allowances to prevent “worthy”
employees from falling into destitution. Lee Squier,
who investigated pension practices around 1910, found
that “[m]any corporations report that individual provision has been made for worn-out or incapacitated
workmen, — each case being dealt with on its merits.” 31
The practices of firms that made “individual provision” generally were very informal. Most did not
develop rules to govern the pension arrangement or
documents to describe it to employees. Indeed, it was
not unusual for employees to be told nothing at all

26
See generally Sanford M. Jacoby, Employing Bureaucracy:
Managers, Unions, and the Transformation of Work in American
Industry, 1900-1945 40-49 (1985).
27
See Ransom, et al., supra note 22, at 12-13; Haber and
Gratton, supra note 22, at 107-08. See also Brian Gratton, “‘A
Triumph in Modern Philanthropy’: Age Criteria in Labor
Management at the Pennsylvania Railroad, 1875-1930,” 64
Bus. Hist. Rev. 630, 634 (1990).
28
Sass, supra note 22, at 29.
29
See Haber and Gratton, supra note 22, at 109; see also
Ransom et al., supra note 22, at 13-14.
30
“To keep worn-out, incapacitated men on the pay roll,”
Lee Squier wrote, “is an economic waste. To turn such adrift
is not humane and exercises a depressing influence upon
workers still in the prime of life.” Lee Squier, Old Age Dependency in the United States 105 (1912).
31
Id.
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because there was literally no “plan” to tell them
about.32
After the turn of the twentieth century, more and more
firms and, in particular, the large enterprises that introduced the “visible hand” to American industrial management abandoned informal pensioning in favor of more
formal, less reactive retirement arrangements. These
firms made pensioning a part of a larger system of personnel management.33 As Lee Squier observed, these
“systems of pensions” were “almost without exception
inspired by economic motives,” rather than altruism.34
The plan initiated in January 1900 by the Pennsylvania
Railroad Company, “perhaps the most advanced business organization in the world,” served as an inducement
and model for many firms. The development of pensioning at the Pennsylvania illustrates the concerns that led
firms to adopt plans in the early decades of the century.35

In the second and third decades of the
twentieth century, it became clear that
the pay-as-you-go approach was no
way to manage pension costs.
The Pennsylvania’s retirement plan was part of a
comprehensive system of personnel administration
based on age and length of service.36 Under this system,
the firm did not consider applicants who were over 35
years of age. Once hired, an employee’s compensation
was governed by a detailed seniority system. An employee age 65 or older with 30 years of service who
became disabled, whether management or wage
worker, was eligible to receive a pension equal to 1
percent of his average salary over his last 10 years of
employment multiplied by his total years of service
with the firm. All employees were forcibly retired at
age 70. If an employee had 30 years of service, he would
receive a pension based on salary and length of service.
Employees played no role in financing their benefits.
The company retained complete responsibility for
paying for pensions to ensure that the plan was “absolutely subject to company direction and control.”
This control was reflected clearly in one of the most
important features of the plan: The pensions it provided were discretionary. The Pennsylvania reserved
the right to terminate the plan as a whole or any individual employee’s pension at any time. 37
32
Id. See also 1 Latimer, supra note 20, at 19; NICB, supra note
19, at 42-7; Conant, supra note 19, at 131-42; Sass, supra note
22, at 23-7.
33
See Sass, supra note 22, at 28-37, 46-55; Gratton, supra note
27, at 639-45.
34
Squier, supra note 30, at 106.
35
See Sass, supra note 22, at 28-37, 38-40; see also Gratton,
supra note 27, at 631 and n.2.
36
This paragraph is based on Sass, supra note 22, at 33-35
and Gratton, supra note 27, at 644-645.
37
For a perceptive contemporary analysis of the control
issue, see Henry S. Pritchett, “Contributory and Non-Contributory Pension Systems,” in Carnegie Foundation for the
Advancement of Teaching, Seventh Annual Report of the President
and of the Treasurer, 59-63 (1912).
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Pennsylvania executives believed this plan would
rationalize personnel administration in a manner that
economized on labor costs while producing a smooth
flow of employees through the firm. Managers had
become concerned in the 1890s that the company’s
seniority system compromised efficiency. “The average
pay received by [men 65 and older],” one executive
explained, “is $55 per month, and their places could
probably be filled by two-thirds of younger men at an
average of $40.00 per month.”38 The introduction of a
mandatory retirement provision promised to harness
expenses under the railroad’s existing informal pension arrangement by allowing the firm to replace older,
high-wage workers with smaller numbers of younger,
lower-paid employees. Managers believed these
savings would substantially offset the additional cost
of paying pensions to retiring employees.39 In addition,
the regular pattern of mandatory retirements promised
t o e n ha n ce o rg an iz at ion al e fficie n cy b y g iving
managers more flexibility in staffing and by reinforcing
younger workers’ commitment to the firm with the
prospect of future promotions.40
Yet as different as the sophisticated, formal plans
created by large firms were from informal pension
arrangements, the modes of financing were similar. In
most early plans, the employer paid pensions out of its
current revenues.41 In pension argot, the plans were
“pay-as-you-go.” Although there were some sophisticated rationales for pay-as-you-go financing, most employers likely adopted this method because it was “the
simplest and most straightforward way” to provide
retirement income.42 No financial arrangements were
made before employees retired. After a n employee
retired, the employer made the payments called for by
its p lan and took “a charge against net earnings or
operating income for any period equal to the amount
of benefits paid in that period.” 43 In other words, firms
adopted the same financial practices they used for
wages and salaries. Pension payments were “dealt with
as supplementary pay roll.” 44

II. The Advent of Advance Funding
In the second and third decades of the twentieth
century, it became clear that the pay-as-you-go approach was no way to manage pension costs.45 In the
1910s, a number of public employers encountered cash

38

Gratton, supra note 27, at 640.
See id. at 640-42; Sass, supra note 22, at 34-5.
40
See Sass, supra note 22, at 35.
41
See 2 Latimer, supra note 20, at 580.
42
Charles L. Trowbridge, “ABC’s of Pension Funding,” 44
Harv. Bus. Rev. 115, 116 (1966). For a justification, see Sass,
supra note 22, at 34.
43
Trowbridge, supra note 42, at 116; see also Dan M. McGill
and Donald S. Grubbs, Jr., Fundamentals of Private Pensions
371-373 (6th ed. 1989).
44
M.B. Folsom, “Old Age in the Balance Sheet,” 143 Atlantic Monthly 399, 401 (1929).
45
See generally Sass, supra note 22, at 56-87.
39

TAX NOTES, December 6, 1999

COMMENTARY / SPECIAL REPORT

shortages when the costs of their plans rapidly increased out of all proportion to expectations. The same
problem hit many private firms in the 1920s. In 1926,
a Department of Labor investigator described the experience of pay-as-you-go “industrial pension plans”
in terms that applied equally to public plans:
At first the expense is usually not serious. When
a plan is initiated there are apt to be but few
employees who have reached the retiring age,
and for some years pensioners may be few, but
as new workers each year reach the age limit and
are added to the roll, while those already on it
are apt to remain there for some time, the cost
mounts rapidly. 46
By 1915 this pattern of escalating costs produced
financial difficulties and reorganizations of teacher
pension plans in a number of cities and states.47 In the
same year, the U.S. Steel pension plan amended its age
and service requirements in the face of rising costs.
This plan’s troubles were a particularly ominous sign.
Andrew Carnegie had contributed $4 million and the
company $8 million, and the plan had only begun
operation in 1911.48 Another plan based on Carnegie’s
largesse, that of the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, reorganized several years later
for similar reasons.49 These events and others like the
much publicized failure of the pension plan of Morris
& Co. in the mid 1920s gave credence to the warnings
of the first generation of American pension specialists
that pensions would be secure only if employers
funded these obligations in advance.50
According to critics, pay-as-you-go financing
misapprehended the nature of pension costs. As one
put it, an employer with a pay-as-you-go plan thought
“on a ‘cash disbursement’ rather than an ‘accrual’
basis.” 51 Building on studies by British actuaries, self46
Mary Conyngton, “Industrial Pensions for Old Age and
Disability,” 22 Monthly Lab. Rev. 21, 50-1 (1926).
47
Teachers’ pension systems that experienced financial difficulties by the mid 1910s included Puerto Rico, New Jersey,
Maryland, Virginia, New York City, Boston, Indianapolis,
Philadelphia, and Cincinnati. See Clyde Furst, “Pensions for
Public-School Teachers,” in Addresses and Proceedings of the
Fifty-Fourth Annual Meeting of the National Education Association 140 (1916); see also Rainard Robbins, Pension Planning in
the United States 25-39 (1952); Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, Thirteenth Annual Report of the President
and of the Treasurer, 109-15 (1918).
48
See “Steel Corporation Pensions,” 95 The Iron Age 902
(1915).
49
See Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, Seventeenth
Annual Report of the President and of the Treasurer, 157 (1922);
see also Ellen Condliffe Lagemann, Private Power for the Public
Good: A History of the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement
of Teaching 160-61, 168-73 (1983).
50
See Sass, supra note 22, at 57-58. See also Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, Thirteenth Annual Report
of the President and of the Treasurer, 109-115 (1918); Gurden
Edwards, “Industrial Pension Plans Collapsing,” 26 The Annalist 637 (1925).
51
Ingalls Kimball, Discussion in Edward S. Cowdrick, Pensions: A Problem of Management 27 (American Management
Ass’n, Annual Convention Series No. 75, 1928).
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educated pension reformers in the 1910s, joined by
insurance industry representatives in the 1920s, argued
that the pay-as-you-go method misunderstood the incidence of an employer’s pension liabilities.52 “If you
should buy a ton of coal in December, and burn it in
December,” an insurance company executive explained,
it would be charged against December production, no matter whether you paid for it in January,
February or March. Nobody pays any attention,
in cost accounting, to the day on which the bill
for material used is paid. Yet with pensions, you
pension a man on December 31st, make no account of it at all, but on January 31st you pay the
first payment of $50.00 and charge up $50.00 as
a part of the January expense.53
These experts argued that an employer incurred its
pension liabilities over an employee’s entire working
career, not when the employee retired and received
pension payments. As one explained, “Since pensions
are given for service rendered by employees, and, more
particularly, since the longer the service the greater the
pension, it is apparent that a liability for future pensions accrues concurrently with service rendered.” 54
Likewise, a contemporary accounting text advised that
“current contributions to pension funds based on the
scientific computation of the liability accruing from
year to year should be treated as operating expenses
and taken into consideration in costs.” “[F]rom the
practical viewpoint,” the author counseled, pension
costs were “generally too important an item to be
omitted from operating expenses and costs.” 55
The misguided “cash disbursement” method led
many employers to underestimate the financial burden
of a pension plan. Firms often made cost projections
by comparing the amount of pension payments in a
particular year with the payroll expenses for the same
year. Managers usually made this comparison in the
early years of a plan when there were few retirees and,
thus, relatively low pension expenses. The “reassuringly insignificant” costs in these forecasts lulled employers into complacency.56 For example, a Western
Electric official who interviewed railway officers in the
early 1900s reported “an absolute unanimity” that the
expense of a pension system was “not burdensome.” 57
But as pension reformers emphasized again and again,
comparing pension payments to payroll expense was
meaningless. “[T]he cost of a pension system,” said
Henry Pritchett, the President of the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching and an early

52

See Sass, supra note 22, at 62-76.
See Kimball, supra note 51, at 27.
54
Bryce M. Stewart, Financial Aspects of Industrial Pensions
16 (American Management Ass’n, Gen. Management Series
No. 87, 1928).
55
James H. Bliss, Management Through Accounts 705 (1924).
56
Gurden Edwards refers to “reassuringly insignificant”
costs in “The Way Out of the Industrial Pension Crisis,” 26
The Annalist 667 (1925).
57
Quoted in Sass, supra note 22, at 40.
53
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proponent of pension funding, “can bear no stable relation to operating expenses, since the pension represents an accumulated debt for past services, for the
payment of which no reserve has been set aside.” 58
Contrary to these misleadingly low estimates, payas-you-go financing eventually produces higher outof-pocket contributions than any other method of pension finance. This is so because “[t]he funding method
is . . . the controlling factor in determining how much
of the eventual cost [of a pension plan] is to be paid at
a particular point of time.” 59 The more funds an employer puts aside to meet its pension liabilities in the
early years of operation when there are few retirees,
the lower its financial contributions will be later when
employees retire in larger numbers. In other words,
advance funding allows a firm to spread its pension
expense over a longer period of time. Because pay-asyou-go financing does nothing to spread an employer’s
expense, “the annual outlay under this arrangement,
expressed as a percentage of payroll, ultimately
reaches a level that is considerably higher than that of
any other financial method.”60 Having begun with the
lowest out-of-pocket costs, pay-as-you-go plans end up
with the highest.61
Furthermore, many early proponents of funding
were struck by the fact that advance funding lowers
the total out-of-pocket cost of a pension plan.62 This
fact derives from a simple equation of pension finance:
an employer ’s out-of-pocket contributions equal the
amount of pension payments reduced by the investment income earned by funds set aside to meet those
payments.63 Under a pay-as-you-go plan, no funds are
set aside to meet the firm’s liability, so the employer’s
out-of-pocket contributions equal the amount of pension payments. In contrast, each dollar of investment
income on funds set aside to meet pension obligations
reduces by a dollar the contributions the employer
must make in the future. If funds are set aside over an
employee’s entire career, investment income can greatly reduce a firm’s out-of-pocket cost. As one funding
advocate put it, a pay-as-you-go plan “plans to spend
two or three times as much money . . . as would be
required if sums were set aside each year to accumulate
during the [employee’s] period of service.” 64 One wide-

58
Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, Thirteenth Annual Report of the President and of the Treasurer, 114
(1918).
59
Charles L. Trowbridge, “Fundamentals of Pension Funding,” 4 Transactions of the Soc’y of Actuaries 17, 17 (1952).
60
McGill and Grubbs, supra note 43, at 372.
61
See Sass, supra note 22, at 80-83 and fig. 4.1; Trowbridge,
supra note 59, at 17.
62
See Edwards, supra note 56. As Trowbridge observes,
“the choice of funding method” affects the out-of-pocket expense of a pension plan and the distribution of this expense
over time, but it “in no way affects true over-all costs, which
are a function of the benefits to be provided and certain other
factors such as mortality, interest, and employee withdrawal.” Trowbridge, supra note 59, at 17.
63
See Trowbridge, supra note 59, at 18-19.
64
Furst, supra note 47, at 140.
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ly cited author claimed that “compound interest”
allowed an employer to substitute manageable levels
of contributions for the “parasitic burden” of a pay-asyou-go plan.65
By the mid 1920s, informed commentators recognized this critique of pay-as-you-go pensioning to “furnish as accurate an appraisal of the future pension
situation as can be reached by the use of the data available.”66 Some rejected pay-as-you-go financing out of
hand. In 1928 Henry Pritchett wrote that “experience
has shown the cash disbursement plan to be the most
costly, the most unscientific, the most prejudicial to the
interests of stockholders, the most lacking in economic
justification, the most speculative for both employer
and employee, and altogether the most dangerous as
regards the improvement of the retirement situation in
industry and elsewhere.”67 Even sanguine observers
conceded that the critics’ arguments and prescriptions
had to be given serious attention. Edward Cowdrick,
a prominent writer on personnel issues, observed in
1924 that “no mistake is likely to be made by appropriating for pensions an annual amount sufficient
to build up gradually a reserve in excess of immediate
needs.”68
Some firms responded to the critique of pay-as-yougo pensioning by adopting a more responsible method
of managing pension costs. In the 1910s and 1920s, the
most common strategies were (1) to create a balancesheet reserve, (2) to make contributions to a pension
trust, or (3) to purchase annuities from a life insurance
company.69 Only the first two are relevant for understanding the origins of the federal tax treatment of
private pensions.70
Under the balance-sheet reserve approach, an employer would “create a fund internally and within the
control of the company, though perhaps handled by
trustees acting for the company.”71 The fund was an

65

Edwards, supra note 56, at 668.
Edward S. Cowdrick, “Will the Pension Break the Business?” 13 Am. Mgmt. Rev., Aug. 1924, at 4. See also Sass, supra
note 22, at 62.
67
Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, Twenty-Third Annual Report of the President and of the Treasurer 96-97
(1928).
68
Cowdrick, supra note 66, at 4.
69
Sass, supra note 22, at 85-87; 2 Latimer, supra note 20, at
570.
70
Although the most fervent supporters of advance funding favored group annuities, annuity contracts became an
important medium for funding pension obligations of
private plans only in the mid to late 1920s. Sass, supra note
22, at 67-76. Group annuities are not directly relevant to the
early development of the tax treatment of private pensions
because employers did not deduct amounts used to purchase
group annuities under the provision of the code that
governed pension trusts. Annuity payments fell under the
section of the code that allowed employers to deduct
reasonable business expenses. Congress consolidated the tax
treatment of deductions for pension contributions and purchase of annuities in the Revenue Act of 1942. See Robbins,
supra note 21, at 77-78.
71
Bliss, supra note 55, at 269.
66
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accounting reserve that registered the employer ’s
prospective liability as employees accrued pension
benefits.72 A reserve of this sort helped a firm plan its
future pension payments but did little to protect employees. According to one accounting text, “The disadvantage of [an internal reserve] from the employees’
point of view is that it does not absolutely assure a
pension according to the agreement, in that such internal pension fund is liable to claims of creditors of the
company in the event of liquidation . . . .”73 In addition,
a pension reserve, like the reserves an employer might
create for other prospective liabilities, was “usually
self-imposed and [might] therefore be changed at will
. . . .” 74 One proponent of trusteed plans alluded to a
“case where stock control of a corporation was bought
up and the control taken out of the hands of the people
who wanted to build up this fund for employees. In
such a case there is nothing to prevent them from turning the pension reserve back into the surplus, or distributing it as dividends, or using it to increase the
value of the stock.”75
Under a formal pension trust, the employer entered
into a trust agreement, perhaps with a trust company
serving as trustee. The employer (and, in the case of a
contributory plan, the employees as well) transferred
funds to “trustees or a trust company . . . entirely
removed from the control of the organization.”76 The
contributions and investment income of the trust
would be used to pay pensions to retired employees.
In theory, a pension trust protected employees by placing plan assets beyond the reach of the employer’s
creditors.77 But many early pension trusts fell short of
the niceties of a formal trust arrangement. In some,
perhaps most, cases, the “trust” was revocable and was
little more than a bank account maintained in the name
of the pension plan by “trustees” who were employees
of the plan sponsor. 78

III. Deferred Comp., Advance Funding & the Code
Very few employers had taken steps toward responsible pension financing practices when Congress established the income tax. The early income tax did nothing
to encourage funding and probably impeded it. One

reason was that funding of pension promises raised
more vexing tax questions than pay-as-you-go pensioning. A second and more important reason was that
the Internal Revenue Code was biased against deferred
compensation. The bias existed because the vehicle an
employer used to finance a pension plan — the firm
itself or a pension trust — paid tax at higher rates than
plan participants did. The bias existed whether a firm
funded or not, but it was most apparent when an employer funded its retirement plan through a trust. In
such a case, the trust paid tax on income of assets
segregated to meet pension obligations to employees
who, if they paid tax at all, faced much lower rates than
did the trust. When legislators amended the code in
1926 to eliminate this discrepancy, their goal was to
encourage employers to fund retirement plans, not to
create retirement plans. The amendment encouraged
funding because a funded plan escaped the code’s bias
against deferred compensation.

From the perspective of an employer
that wished to fund its pension
obligations, the initial tax issue
concerned the timing of deductions for
amounts accrued to a pension reserve
or contributed to a trust.
For all its actuarial shortcomings, pay-as-you-go
pensioning was relatively easily accommodated to income taxation. The Bureau of Internal Revenue addressed the income tax treatment of pay-as-you-go
plans by adopting the treatment under the corporation
excise tax of 1909.79 In 1910, Treasury ruled that corporations could not deduct pension payments because
pensions were “gratuities and not ‘ordinary and necessary expenses.’”80 The ruling was a triumph of legal
form — the theory that pensions were gifts — over
business function. Because retirement plans played an
importan t rule in personnel administration, the
Bureau’s decision drew protests from corporate executives and accounting experts.81 Treasury quickly

79

Tariff of 1909, ch. 6, section 38, 36 Stat. 11, 112.
T.D. 1606, 13 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 43 [para. 59] (1910).
81
See “Tax Law Pamphlet Arouses Protest,” N.Y. Times,
Dec. 29, 1910, at 8. Recall Squier’s observation in 1912 t hat
firms adopted pension plans “almost without exception” on
the basis of “economic motives.” Squier, supra note 30, at 106.
Christopher Howard argues that granting corporations a
deduction for pension payments was a tax expenditure because few firms had pension plans. “All things considered,”
he says, “business expenses for retirement pensions were
anything but ordinary and necessary for the vast majority of
employers.” Howard, supra note 14, at 57. Howard’s conclusion is not warranted for several reasons. First, a tax expenditure generally is conceived to be a provision of law that
causes a taxpayer ’s “taxable income” to appear to be lower
than its “economic income.” A rule that causes a taxpayer’s
“taxable income” to be higher than its “economic income” is
a tax penalty. The 1910 Treasury ruling that denied deduc80
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See E. L. Hicks and C. L. Trowbridge, Employer Accounting
for Pensions: An Analysis of the Financial Accounting Standards
Board’s Preliminary Views and Exposure Draft 16-17 (1985).
73
Bliss, supra note 55, at 270.
74
Roy B. Kester, Advanced Accounting 595 (3rd rev. ed.
1930). See also Bliss, supra note 55, at 270.
75
“Revenue Act of 1928: Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on Finance,” 70th Cong. 209 (1928)[hereinafter 1928
Senate Hearings] (testimony of William S. Elliott).
76
Bliss, supra note 55, at 269.
77
Id.
78
Sass, supra note 22, at 85. In the leading case of Hibbard,
Spencer, Bartlett & Co. v. Commissioner, 5 B.T.A. 464 (1926), the
Board of Tax Appeals recognized a “trust” in circumstances
in which few of the formalities of a formal trust arrangement
were present. For discussion of the tax consequences of
revocability, see note 147 below.
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reversed itself, ruling that “[a]mounts paid for pensions to retired employees, or to their families or others
dependent upon them . . . are proper deductions as
‘ordinary and necessary expenses’ . . . .” 82 When Treasury issued income tax regulations in January 1914, the
text of Article 120 — which addressed the deductibility
of pension expenses — was taken verbatim from the
1911 ruling under the corporation excise tax.83
Pay-as-you-go plans were easily accommodated to
income taxation because they made timing issues very
simple. The employer deducted its pension expense at
the same time the employee received taxable income.84
By contrast, an employer that funded its pension
obligations made contributions long before individual
employees received payments based on those contributions. Furthermore, the contingent character of pension arrangements compounded the timing problem.
In the late 1910s, virtually all pension plans required
long service before an employee qualified to receive a
pension.85 And employers commonly reserved the
right to terminate the plan or refuse to pay any employee’s pension.86 At least until 1926, when Congress
directly addressed pension trusts, these complexities

tions for pension payments was a tax penalty. It made a
corporation’s “taxable income” appear to be higher than its
“economic income by denying deductions . . . for the cost of
producing income.” See Boris I. Bittker, “Accounting for
Federal ‘Tax Subsidies’ in the National Budget,” 22 Nat’l Tax
J. 244, 245 and n. 4 (1969). In other words, Treasury’s and
Howard’s narrow readings of “ordinary and necessary expenses” depart from a true tax on net income. Setting aside
this objection, it should also be noted that many business
practices are “anything but ordinary and necessary for the
vast majority of employers.” For example, few firms buy flour.
Does that make granting a deduction to bakeries for purchasing flour a tax expenditure? Obviously not, because it is
ordinary and necessary for bakeries to buy flour. But many
railroad companies had pension plans by 1909. It was thus
“ordinary” for railroad companies to have pension plans, and
managers had concluded it was “necessary.” So it would
appear that railroads ought to have been allowed to deduct
pension payments. But railroads were not the only firms that
offered pension plans. Would it be fair to allow railroads to
deduct pension payments but not to allow other firms to do
so? Would this be a tax expenditure? As the author of an early
treatise observed, “What may be comprehended in the general description of ‘ordinary and necessary expenses’ will
depend greatly upon the nature of the business, trade, or
pursuit carried on.” Henry Campbell Black, A Treatise on the
Law of Income Taxation Under Federal and State Laws section 89
at 179 (1st ed. 1913).
82
T.D. 1675, 14 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 20 [para. 57] (1911). See
also “Corporation Tax Decisions,” Wall St. J., Feb. 16, 1911, at
7.
83
Compare T.D. 1675, supra note 82, at 20 and T.D. 1944, 16
Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 68 [Art. 120] (1914). The 1914 ruling does
add a comma and correct a typographical error.
84
See, e.g., T.D. 2690, 20 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 134 [Art. 4, para.
49] and 195 [Art. 136, para. 438] (1918).
85
Conyngton reported in 1926 that pension plans commonly required 20 to 25 years of service to qualify for benefits.
Conyngton, supra note 46, at 47.
86
2 Latimer, supra note 20, at 719-721; Robbins, supra note
21, at 3-4.
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left firms that funded much more in the dark about
how to comply with the tax laws than firms that maintained pay-as-you-go plans.

A. Employer Deduction
From the perspective of an employer that wished to
fund its pension obligations, the initial tax issue concerned the timing of deductions for amounts accrued
to a pension reserve or contributed to a trust. Allowing
an employer to deduct these amounts coordinated the
classification of its operations for tax-accounting purposes with its cost-accounting practices. Under the accrual methods favored by critics of pay-as-you-go pensioning, pension accruals and the amounts set aside to
meet them were costs of doing business for the year
the accruals occurred. The income of a business ought
to be reduced to reflect these costs.87 Denying deductions would subject firms to taxation on amounts set
aside to meet this expense and complicate corporate
accounting procedures by introducing conflicting
treatments of the same transaction for cost-accounting
and tax-accounting purposes.

It is useful to view the tax treatment of
pension plans through the lens of the
treatment of stock-bonus and
stock-purchase plans.
Notwithstanding these concerns, the Bureau of Internal Revenue denied deductions “for contributions
to a pension fund the resources of which are held by
the corporation, the amount deductible in such case
being the amount actually paid to the employee.”88 The
uncertainties of such an arrangement — discretionary
reserves “held by the corporation” to meet discretionary obligations — apparently led the Bureau to refuse
to recognize the practice.89 At least one prominent tax
accountant objected to the Bureau’s action, however.
“[I]f it can be shown that the contributions to a fund
are not in excess of the reasonable requirements of the
pension plan, applicable to the employees on the
payrolls during the period in question,” argued Robert
Montgomery, “the entire contribution is clearly a necessary expense of the business.” He criticized the regulation as “another case of failure to permit the deduction of amounts set aside during accounting periods as
accruing expenses.”90
87

Bliss, supra note 55, at 705.
T.D. 2690, supra note 84, at 195 [Art. 136, para. 439].
89
The questions whether and what reserve accounts a firm
ought to be able to deduct were a continuing source of conflict between tax authorities and accountants. See Comment,
“Accounting Principle v. Tax Practice: Treatment of Deferred
Credits and Reserves,” 64 Harv. L. Rev. 1010 (1948). Tax accounting generally does not allow deductions for reserves for
future liabilities: “taxpayers might try to deduct excessive
reserves under the financial accounting principle of conservatism, with resulting excessive revenue losses.” Stanley S.
Surrey and Paul R. McDaniel, Tax Expenditures 189 (1985).
90
Robert H. Montgomery, Income Tax Procedure 1919 420-21
(1919).
88
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Use of a trust to fund pension obligations fared better. In contrast to a balance-sheet reserve, an employer
that created a pension trust at least nominally parted
with the assets contributed to the trust. Where “annual
appropriations . . . are paid to trustees who hold them,
and the accumulations th ereon, in trust for the
beneficiaries,” explained an accounting text, “the payment of wages consists of two parts, one paid currently
to the workman, the other paid to his trustees.” 91
Another text designated trust contributions “an out
and out expenditure so far as the company is concerned.” 92 The clear picture these texts present is
clouded by the great discretion employers exercised
over pension plans and pension trusts. Again, employers commonly reserved the right to terminate a
plan or amend its terms as well as the right to decide
to pay or refuse to pay pensions to particular employees. And few pension trusts contained provisions
limiting the employer ’s power to revoke the trust. If
the terms of a trust allowed it, an employer apparently
could abolish its plan, revoke the trust, and recover its
contributions. 93
Notwithstanding these contingencies, in 1919 the
Bureau placed its blessing on funding through a trust.
The Bureau denied a deduction in a case in which a
firm “reserve[d] absolute discretion as to the selection
of the employees to be benefited.” 94 But it approved
deductions for contributions to a trust that was “organized entirely separate and distinct from the corporation, having its own set of books, making its own
investments, and paying its own expenses, legal title
of which does not remain in the corporation . . . .” 95
The reasoning behind this holding again illustrates the
equivocal character of pension plans under the tax
laws. Although corporate gifts generally were not deductible, the Bureau did allow firms to deduct contributions such “as, donations to a hospital upon consideration that employees of the corporation are to
have a ward for their use in case of accident or illness.”
Such donations “legitimately represent a consideration
for a benefit flowing directly or indirectly to the corporation as an incident of its business . . . .” 96 The
Bureau viewed a corporation’s “donations” to a pension trust the same way. They were “donations to a
charitable institution conducted for the benefit of the
corporation’s employees or their dependents representing a consideration for a benefit flowing directly
to the corporation as an incident of its business . . . .” 97
The benefit to the corporation supported the deduction.

91
Henry Rand Hatfield, Accounting: Its Principles and
Problems 238 (1927).
92
Bliss, supra note 55, at 270.
93
2 Latimer, supra note 20, at 665, 671-72. For discussion of
the tax consequences of revocability, see note 147 below.
94
S. 965, 1 C.B. 224 (1919).
95
O. D. 110, 1 C.B. 224 (1919).
96
T.D. 2090, 16 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 278 (1914).
97
O. D. 110, supra note 95. See Montgomery, supra note 90,
at 427-430. See also Robbins, supra note 21, at 73-74; Altman,
supra note 1, at 447 and n. 52.
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B. Taxation of Employee/Beneficiary
The correlative of the q uestion when employers
should be allowed deductions was when employees
should be taxed for pension accruals or contributions.
It is useful to view the tax treatment of pension plans
through the lens of the treatment of stock-bonus and
stock-purchase plans. A common arrangement of the
latter sort was for a corporation to transfer stock to a
trust for the benefit of employees. An employee’s interest remained contingent until he fulfilled specified
conditions, at which point title to the stock transferred
from the corporation or trustees to the employee.98 “Although the subject was in considerable confusion,” the
Bureau ruled that employer c ontributions were taxable
as immediate income to the employee “unless the contributions were under a plan under which their eventual receipt by the employees was too contingent to
permit of the immediate treatment as income constructively.” 99 Thus, an employee whose interest was subject
to a condition was not taxed immediately. His interest
“constitute[d] taxable income . . . in the year in which
the title vested in [him] . . . .” 100 In 1921, Congress
amended the code by adding section 219(f), which provided that contributions to “stock bonus and profitsharing” plans would not be taxed to the employee
“until . . . distributed or made available to the extent
that it exceeds the amounts paid in by him.” 101
Although section 219(f) mentioned only “stock
bonus and profit-sharing” plans, the Bureau reportedly
gave the same treatment to employees who participated in pension plans.102 There appear to have been
several reasons for this. First, the contingency of an
employee’s interest in a pension plan weighed against
taxing him when contributions were made to a pension
trust. Lengthy service requirements meant that many
employees who accrued credit never received a pension because they left the employer’s service before
they met the service requirement.103 In addition, employers usually reserved the right to amend or
eliminate their plans.104 Furthermore, even if an employee had a vested right to pension accruals, it was
extremely difficult to allocate employer contributions
to particular employees because most early pension
plans were defined-benefit plans that did not maintain

98
See O. D. 763, 4 C. B. 76 (1921); O. D. 791, 4 C. B. 76-77
(1921). See also Robert H. Montgomery, Income Tax Procedure
1923 428-430 (1923).
99
See Jacob Mertens, Jr., 1939 Cumulative Supplement to Randolph E. Paul and Jacob Mertens, Jr., The Law of Federal Income
Taxation 1090 and n. 97g (1934). See also E.E. Rossmoore,
Federal Income Taxes: Principles and Practice 397-398 (1924); I.T.
1891, 3-1 C.B. 132-138 (1924); and 1 Randolph E. Paul and
Jacob Mertens, Jr., The Law of Federal Income Taxation, section
11.36 at 519-520 (1934).
100
O. D. 791, supra note 98, at 77.
101
Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, section 219(f), 42 Stat. 227,
247.
102
This paragraph follows Robbins, supra note 21, at 30-31
and Altman, supra note 1, at 449-450. See also Mertens, supra
note 99, at section 23.119 at 1090 and n. 97g.
103
Conyngton, supra note 46, at 47.
104
Id. at 44.
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individual accounts. Rather, firms made contributions
on behalf of the entire population of covered employees. Under these circumstances, actuary Rainard
Robbins observed in a perceptive 1949 study of pension
taxation, an employee’s interest in his employer’s contributions was “not the kind of a credit that furnishes
a strong defense for taxation despite the fact that new
economic value is the basis of the contributions that
give rise to it.” 105 Apparently on these grounds, the
Bureau deferred taxation until an employee received
benefits. Congress made this treatment statutory in
1926 when it amended section 219(f) to include pension
plans.106

C. Tax Treatment of a Pension Trust
The Bureau’s refusal to allow a deduction for pension accruals unless an employer contributed to a separate fund expressed a clear preference for businesses
to use a trust to fund pension obligations. It became
clear in the 1920s, however, that the general principles
for taxing trusts were incompatible with the intermediary function pension trusts performed.
When an employer promises deferred compensation
to its employees, the economic effect is for employees
to make a loan to the firm that is repaid when the firm
pays the promised compensation.107 The amount of the
loan is equal to the present value of the obligation
incurred by the employer. I mportantly, the loaned
funds might also be paid to employees as additional
wages or salaries.108 As Daniel Halperin has shown, the
relative rates of taxation that employers, retirement
plans, and employees face are very important in such
a transaction.109 Today income earned by assets of a
qualified plan is not taxed, while the income on
amounts invested by individuals is subject to taxation.
As proponents of tax expenditure analysis emphasize,
this creates a bias in favor of deferred compensation
over wage and salary income.
Assume, for example, that an employee is taxed at
a 15 percent rate, that employers receive a deduction
for contributions to a pension trust, that trust income
is not taxed, and that the interest rate is 8 percent.110
Assume further that the employer promises that in year
x+15 it will pay the employee a single lump-sum payment worth $1,000 (pre-tax year x). [See Table 1, Example 1] If the employer deposits $1,000 in a trust in
year x, in year x+15 the principal and interest on this

amount will total $3,172 [$1,000 x (1.08)15]. The after-tax
value of the lump sum payment to the employee in
year x+15 is about $2,696 [$3,172-$476 (15 percent tax)].
On the other hand, if the employer paid the $1,000 as
wages and the employee invested this amount, the income paid to the employee would be subject to tax, so
the employee would invest $850, instead of $1,000. Furthermore, the income earned on this investment would
be taxed at the employee’s 15 percent rate. As a result,
the return on the investment will be 6.8 percent rather
than 8 percent. At this rate of return, the $1,000 invested by the employee will increase to only about
$2,280 [($1,000 x 0.85) x (1.08-0.012)15] in 15 years. This
tax structure tilts in favor of deferred compensation
because the tax exemption of trust income allows the
employee to receive $416 more in year x+15 by trading
$1,000 of pre-tax wage or salary income for a $1,000
contribution to a retirement plan.111
Table 1
Investment of $1,000 Payment for 15 Years at 8%
Interest 112
Example 1: Employer/Trust Tax Rate = 0%;
Employee Tax Rate = 15%
Regular
401(k)
Account
Plan
Contribution
$1,000
$1,000
Tax on Contribution
150
0
Deposit
850
1,000
Value at Withdrawal
2,280
3,172
Tax on Withdrawal
0
476
Net Withdrawal
2,280
2,696
Gain Over Regular Account
—
416
Example 2: Employer Tax Rate = 15%;
Employee Not Taxed113
Employer
Regular
Plan
Account
Contribution
$1,000
$1,000
Tax on Contribution
150
0
Deposit
850
1,000
Value at Withdrawal
2,280
3,172
Payment to Employee114
2,682
3,172
Additional Cost to Employer
490
—
After-Tax Cost to Employer
417
—
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Robbins, supra note 21, at 31.
Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 26, section 219(f), 44 Stat. 9,
33-34.
107
For general discussions of these issues, see Daniel I.
Halperin, “Interest in Disguise: Taxing the ‘Time Value of
Money,’” 95 Yale L. J. 506, 515-524 (1986); Ippolito, supra note
5, at 20-24.
108
The interchangeability of wages and pension contributions is stated very clearly in 1928 Senate Hearings, supra
note 75, at 210, 213. See also Report of Illinois Pension Laws
Commission, 1916, quoted in Conyngton, supra note 46, at 22;
and Hatfield, supra note 91, at 238.
109
Halperin, supra note 107, at 519-524.
110
The figures I use are drawn from Congressional Budget
Office, Tax Policy for Pensions and Other Retirement Saving 3-6
(1987).
106
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111
See Halperin, supra note 107, at 519-524; Stein, supra note
5, at 230.
112
The figures assume that the contribution is deposited
for 15 years at 8 percent interest. Example 1 and most of the
figures in Example 2 are taken from Tax Policy for Pensions
and Other Retirement Saving, supra note 110, at 4 Tbl.1.
113
Consistent with the Bureau of Internal Revenue’s 1919
ruling, I assume that the employer receives no deduction for
pension liabilities set aside in a reserve. I assume that the
employee is subject to tax, but in fact has no tax liability.
114
The employer’s payment is “grossed up” to reflect the
tax deduction the firm receives as a result of the payment.
The after-tax cost of the $2,682 payment is $2,280 ($2,682 $402 [$2,682 x 15% tax rate]).

TAX NOTES, December 6, 1999

COMMENTARY / SPECIAL REPORT

The same principles that incline the tax system
toward deferred compensation when employers face
lower tax rates than employees tilt it against deferred
compensation when employers face higher rates. 115
When an employer faces higher rates of tax on the
investment income of the employee’s “loan” than the
employee would face if he invested the funds himself,
the cost to the employer of providing deferred compensation worth $1,000 in year x will be higher than paying
$1,000 of current compensation in year x. [See Table 1,
Example 2.] If the tax rates in the preceding example
are reversed — the employer facing a 15 percent tax
rate on investment income while the employee pays no
tax — an employee who was paid and invested $1,000
in year x would have $3,172 in year x+15. A firm that
set aside a reserve of $1,000 would accumulate only
$2,280 over the same period. Taking into account the
reduction in taxes the firm would receive as a result of
its payment to the employee, the $1,000 investment
would allow the firm to pay the employee $2,682 in
year x+15. The firm would have to come up with
another $490. Although this additional payment would
reduce the firm’s taxes by $73, the deferred compensation arrangement would still cost the firm $417 more
in year x+15 than had it paid the employee $1,000 in
year x. And as the difference between a firm’s and its
employees’ rates of taxation increases, the additional
cost of paying deferred compensation increases. All
other things being equal, under these circumstances, employers are better off paying wages or salary instead
of deferred compensation.
In fact, the rate structure of the early income tax and
prevailing patterns of coverage under private pension
p lan s cre at ed p reci sely th is prob lem. As Elliot
Brownlee observes, the tax regime that financed WWI
relied on “steeply progressive tax rates and [a] tax base
consisting of the incomes of corporations and wealthy
individuals.”116 Even after Republican politicians
scaled back tax rates in the 1920s, Yale economist and
Treasury advisor T.S. Adams characterized the income
tax as “a class tax of the most extreme form.” The
income tax, Adams observed in 1923, “touches directly
perhaps only 5 or 6 percent of the population . . . .”117
This was so because although all “individuals” were
subject to income taxation, the relatively large personal
exemptions meant that the great majority of people
who received wage or salary income were not taxed.118
A cc ordi n g t o Jo h n Wit te , eve n w he n C on g re ss
broadened the tax base to meet the revenue needs of
World War I, “at most 13 percent of the labor force
[paid] income taxes.”119

115

See Stein, supra note 5, at 243.
W. Elliot Brownlee, Federal Taxation in America: A Short
History 47-48 (1996).
117
Thomas S. Adams, “How Federal Taxes Are Made,” 1923
Proceedings of the 15th Ann. Conf. on Tax’n, Nat’l Tax Ass’n 331,
337 (1923).
118
John Witte, The Politics and Development of the Federal
Income Tax 125-127 figs. 6.2 and 6.3 (1985).
119
Id. at 125.
116
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And while the scope of the tax base was narrow, the
practice of pensioning was concentrated among large
employers whose pension plans were very broad in
coverage.120 In the 1910s and 1920s, researchers at the
Department of Labor found that the plans they
reviewed “[i]n general . . . apply to all grades of employees . . . .”121 Murray Latimer reported similar findings. Indeed, Latimer found only a handful of plans
that excluded all but “higher employees.”122 In other
words, most pension plans covered all or most of the
employees in the sponsoring firm’s workforce. In contrast to their corporate employers, the income of most
employees would not have been taxed.

The same principles that incline the
tax system toward deferred
compensation when employers face
lower tax rates than employees tilt it
against deferred compensation when
employers face higher rates.
The code’s bias against deferred compensation was
clearest when pensions or other compensation were
funded through a trust because the trust segregated and
aggregated assets held for the benefit of a work-force
that might number in the thousands. “Under the 1918
Act the income of such trusts was taxable either to the
trust or the corporation, dependent upon the measure
of control exercised by the corporation over the trust.”123
Whether taxed to the employer or to the trust, trust
income would be taxed at levels well in excess of the
rates faced by all but very affluent employees.
Under the 1918 act, for example, corporate income
in excess of $2,000 was subject to normal tax at a 12
percent rate for calendar year 1918 and a 10 percent
rate for subsequent years.124 In addition, the 1918 act
subjected corporations to excess profits and war profits
taxes in 1918 and to an excess profits tax in 1919 and
thereafter. For 1918 the rates in the top brackets were
65 percent for the excess profits tax and 80 percent for
the war profits tax.125 In 1919 and subsequent years,
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the tax on a firm’s excess profits could reach 40 percent.126 If the investment income of a pension trust was
taxed as additional net income of the sponsoring firm,
the large employers that were most likely to sponsor
pension trusts were virtually certain to pay tax on these
amounts.127 Furthermore, the additional increment of
net income that resulted from crediting trust income to
the firm would be taxed at the firm’s highest marginal
rate. The great majority of employees, again, paid no
tax at all. In 1918, an individual was taxed at a rate of
6 percent on his first $4,000 of net income in excess of
the $1,000 personal exemption.128 An individual taxpayer with no dependents did not face a marginal tax
rate as high as the corporate normal tax rate unless his
net income exceeded $5,000. A married taxpayer with
no dependents had to make at least $6,000.129 In 1919
and thereafter, individuals would have to have even
higher net income to be taxed at a rate as high as the
corporate normal tax rate.130

Section 219(f) solved the aggregation
problem by relieving stock-bonus and
profit-sharing trusts of taxation on
their investment income and deferring
taxation of employees until they
actually received stock or cash.
Taxing investment income to the trust was equally
problematic. And because trust assets were segregated
to meet a plan’s obligations to employees, the tax treatment of pension trusts brought the bias against
deferred compensation clearly into focus. Under the
1918 act, income of a trust was taxed to a beneficiary
only if distributed or distributable to the beneficiary.
Income accumulated in trust for the benefit of “persons
with contingent interests . . .” was “taxed to the
fiduciary as to any single individual . . . .”131 For calendar year 1918, the 1918 act taxed single individuals at
normal tax rates of 6 percent on their first $4,000 of net
income in excess of the $1,000 exemption and at 12
percent thereafter.132 In addition, income in excess of
$5,000 was subject to a surtax that started at a modest
1 percent but eventually climbed to 65 percent for in-
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comes in excess of $1 million.133 In years after 1919,
normal tax rates of 4 percent and 8 percent applied.134
Under these rules, a trust that funded a retirement plan
might be taxed like an individual even though it had
thousands of beneficiaries.
A notice of deficiency issued in 1926 to the Sears,
Roebuck & Co. Employees’ Savings and Profit Sharing
Pension Fund (the Sears Fund) illustrates the operation
of these provisions.135 Indeed, this case underscores the
bias in the code because the Sears Fund was a contributory defined-contribution plan. The plan required each
participating employee to contribute 5 percent of his
or her salary.136 The company contributed 5 percent of
its net earnings, which were allocated to individual
employee accounts in proportion to employee contributions.137 The plan provided that its assets would be
invested “so far as practicable and advisable . . . in
shares of stock of Sears, Roebuck and Co. to the end
that the depositors may, in the largest measure possible, share in the earnings of the Company.”138
The IRS contended that the Sears Fund was a trust
and that it had failed to pay taxes of about $190,000 for
the years 1917 to 1920.139 When the fund petitioned for
redetermination of its liability, the Board of Tax Appeals agreed with the IRS and denied the petition. The
fund drew the board’s attention to the aggregation
problem described above by arguing that the fund was
not a single trust but “a collection of separate trusts for
each employee.”140 The board rejected this contention,
however, and held that the fund was “a single trust
established for the benefit of many beneficiaries” and
“a separate taxable entity.” 141 Although the income of
the fund was divided among the participants, the participants did not have unconditional rights to the funds
allocated to them: “The pro rata shares of earnings did
not become the property of the respective beneficiaries
until and unless they remained in the service of the
company for 10 years, and were at the time participants
in the Fund.” 142 These contingencies required “that the
income in question . . . be taxed to the Fund.”143
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Although the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the Board of Tax Appeals, it did so on
grounds that were applicable to few pension trusts.144
Thus, the Sears case illustrates that the code and regulations appeared to tax a benefit trust on terms that
were incompatible with its function as a financial intermediary for employees who, if they paid any tax at
all, faced much lower marginal rates than the trust.145
In 1921 Congress added section 219(f) to the code to
remedy this aggregation problem as it applied to trusts
created in connection with stock-bonus and profitsharing plans.146 Treasury advisor T.S. Adams explained the amendment in confidential testimony to
the Senate Finance Committee:
The point is this: At the present time many corporations are creating trusts and making arrangements by which, if their employees contribute a
certain amount of money, they will contribute a
certain amount of money, too, for a certain length
of time. Stock may be taken by the employees.
There is some doubt as to whether those trusts,
so created, would not be taxable in their entirety
at the time they accumulated any income, and
subject to surtax. It is proposed here to make it
clear that these trusts shall not be subject to such
tax if they are irrevocably trusts, so that the employer can not take the money back or base it on
a contingency.147
and a separate taxable entity”); Scarborough v. Commissioner,
17 B.T.A. 317, 320 (1929) (In the case of a benefit trust for sick
employees, “[n]o fiduciary or income-tax returns have ever
been made of the income from the fund, because in each year
the income has not been sufficient to require it.”).
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Section 219(f) solved the aggregation problem by
relieving stock-bonus and profit-sharing trusts of taxation on their investment income and deferring taxation
of employees until they received stock or cash.148
The treatment of pension trusts under this provision
is less clear. Some sources indicate that the Bureau
applied section 219(f) to pension trusts even though
they were not included in the language of the 1921
statute.149 But at least one plan conducted its operations
as if it were subject to taxation. In January 1926, David
Krebs, an attorney with Armour & Company, contacted
the Treasury Department about the firm’s pension
plan. “Without entering upon any lengthy discussion
of the subject,” he told Treasury Undersecretary Garrard Winston,
it seems to us that the taxation of a pension fund
narrows the field of investment of the fund and
reduces the rate of income which it might otherwise earn, either by compelling it to invest in tax
exempt securities or to pay tax which reduces its
rate of yield on taxable securities below that
which could be realized upon tax exempts, and
that such limitation of its choice of investments
is a hardship upon the trustees and the fund
which the government could well afford to
relieve in view of the economic benefits of such
plans.150

evidence good faith on the part of the employer actually to
pay the amounts trusteed for employees’ pension purposes.”
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(Bernard D. Reims ed. 1979). In 1938 Congress amended the
code to require the trust instrument to include language that
prevented trust assets from being “used for, or diverted to,
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1938, ch. 289, section 165, 52 Stat. 447, 518 (1938).
148
A 1923 Bureau of Internal Revenue publication noted
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Lower yields would have made tax-exempt securities
poor investments for all or virtually all of the individual employees in the Armour plan.151 But the code
appeared to view a pension trust in terms of its legal
form rather than its intermediary function. As an independent taxable entity, it made sense for the Armour
trust to invest in tax-exempt bonds.
Noting that he had discussed this problem with T.S.
Adams, Krebs said he and Adams agreed that Treasury
would lose nothing by exempting pension plans from
taxation while the plans would gain much. “From the
standpoint of the Treasury,” he wrote, “the taxation of
such funds merely involves an extremely difficult administrative problem without any corresponding revenue because the tax can be escaped through investment
in tax exempt securities, which will provide in case of
any large fund a net yield in excess from that of taxables after payment of income tax.”152

The ‘framers’ of the special tax
treatment of pension plans did not
mean to create a bias in favor of
deferred compensation. They meant to
eliminate a bias against it.
At about the same time, Treasury officials took steps
to have section 219(f) amended to include pension plans.
In February 1926, John Walker, a Treasury official, told
Undersecretary Winston that he did not “acknowledge
[Krebs’s] letter as Dr. Adams and Mr. Krebs . . . were
familiar with the steps that were being taken to amend
section 219 to cover pension funds. . . .”153 Senator
George McLean, R-Conn., offered and the Senate approved such an amendment during consideration of
the Revenue Act of 1926. 154 “I think we [Treasury] will
have no difficulty in keeping the same in conference,”
Walker predicted.155 He was right. The amendment became law because, as the conference report put it, pension plans “are similar to the stock bonus and profitsharing plans covered by subdivision (f). . . .” 156

IV. Conclusion
In their recent study of U.S. international taxation,
Graetz and O’Hear note that the “original intent” of
particular tax policies may furnish “important counter151
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points to the consensus views” of today.157 Their observation is as true for the taxation of deferred compensation as it is for international taxation. Today the conce pt ua l fr am ew ork of t ax-exp en dit ure ana lysis
dominates discussion of the taxation of deferred compensation. Most contemporary debate either presupposes or contests the idea that the tax treatment of
qualified plans is a subsidy to induce employers to
provide retirement benefits. The story I’ve recounted
highlights very different concerns.
The “framers” of the special tax treatment of pension
plans did not mean to create a bias in favor of deferred
compensation. They meant to eliminate a bias against
it. Policymakers were concerned about this bias because they recognized that many employers had compelling business reasons for establishing a definedbenefit pension plan. The experience of the railroad
industry, which was repeated many times in the course
of 20th century, illustrates the point. Until the second
half of this century, managers of large firms seldom
established a retirement plan until a firm had been in
existence for some time. Businesses and, where employees were organized, unions got around to creating
a pension plan when there were older employees that
managers and union officials wished to retire. Under
these circumstances, employers adopted defined-benefit
plans because a DB plan, unlike a defined-contribution
plan, could immediately pay relatively generous pensions to aged employees. DBs did this by giving older
employees past-service credit, that is, by calculating an
employee’s pension on the basis of years of service
before the plan came into being.158
Many analysts have noted that it is “extremely difficult, and perhaps impossible,” to integrate income taxation of a defined-benefit plan and its participants.159 The
impediments to integration have two important consequences. First, the absence of integration means that the
general principles of an income tax often overtax deferred
compensation. A second consequence is that special rules
that abrogate overtaxation often produce undertaxation.
The first consequence was particularly obvious in the
1910s and ’20s because the second was not a problem.
The basic structure of the early income tax and the characteristics of “industrial pension plans” allowed policymakers to mitigate overtaxation without producing much
undertaxation. Since most retirement plans covered a
broad range of employees and most employees paid little
or no income tax, tax-exemption of pension trusts effected
a rough-and-ready integration of the taxation of pension
plans and employees.
Later developments undid the de facto integration of
the 1920s so that the special rules for pension trusts
157
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undertaxed deferred compensation. First came the Social Security Act. For many firms, the Old Age Insurance [OAI] program in the Social Security Act duplicated the functions of a retirement plan with respect to
most employees.160 Consequently, many businesses
coordinated their retirement plans with OAI by reducing benefits or eliminating coverage for workers who
made less than the $3,000 taxable wage base.161 The
result was a shift in the focus of retirement plans
toward the needs of high-compensation employees
who paid income taxes.162 Second, beginning in 1935,
FDR proposed and Congress passed tax increases for
individuals along with reforms to prevent the use of
corporations to avoid taxes.163 Pension plans quickly
emerged as a way for owner-employees to take income
out of a small corporation and defer tax for a lengthy
period of time.164 Third, the Revenue Act of 1942 introduced “mass” taxation and, with it, mass incentives for
tax avoidance.165 Under the “class” tax of 1926, most
employees paid tax at the same rate — zero — as the
pension trust an employer used to fund a retirement
plan. Under the ’42 act, even rank-and-file employees
paid tax at higher rates than a pension trust.
Officials in the Treasury Department developed the
tax-subsidy theory of deferred compensation to explain
and counteract the undertaxation and tax avoidance
that resulted when the taxation of retirement plans and
participants “disintegrated” in the late 1930s and early
’40s.166 The genesis of the subsidy theory illustrates
what political scientist Deborah Stone calls “causal
politics.”167 Policymaking necessarily involves analysis
and argument about the causes of social problems. As
Stone puts it, “policy politics involves strategically
160

On the substitutability of social security and private pensions, see Munnell, supra note 16, at 13-16. See also Sass, supra
note 22, at 98-99.
161
See Murray W. Latimer and Karl Tufel, Trends in Industrial Pensions 10-14 (1940); National Industrial Conference
Board, Company Pension Plans and the Social Security Act 24-26
(Studies in Personnel Policy No. 16, 1939).
162
Sass, supra note 22, at 98-101, 114-119.
163
Brownlee, supra note 116, at 74-75, 77-79.
164
Although it was short-lived, I suspect the undistributed
profits tax in the Revenue Act of 1936 played an important
role in sensitizing taxpayers to the tax avoidance potential of
retirement plans. I discuss this issue in James A. Wooten,
“Regulating the ‘Unseen Revolution’: A Political History of
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974,” draft
Ph.D. Thesis, Yale University, Program in American Studies
(on file with author). On the excess profits tax, see also Witte,
supra note 118, at 102-103. The tax was dramatically reduced
in 1938, and finally repealed in 1939. Id. at 106-107.
165
Brownlee, supra note 116, at 89-100.
166
See Revenue Revision of 1942: Hearings before the
House Ways and Means Committee, 77th Cong. 2405, 2407
(1942) (statement of Randolph Paul). See also Adrian W. DeWind, “Federal Regulation of Pension Plans,” in Designing a
Company Pension Plan 10 (National Industrial Conference
Board, Studies in Personnel Policy No. 67, 1944); Adrian W.
DeWind, “Special Wartime and Other Problems With Respect
to Pension and Profit-Sharing Plans Under the Federal Income Tax,” 3 N.Y.U. Inst. on Fed. Tax’n 87, 90 (1945).
167
Deborah A. Stone, “Causal Stories and the Formation of
Policy Agendas,” 104 Pol. Sci. Q. 281, 284 (1989).

TAX NOTES, December 6, 1999

portraying issues” in an effort to establish “the possibility of control and the assignment of responsibility”
for a social problem.168 “Complex causal explanations,”
she observes, “are not very useful in politics, precisely
because they do not offer a single locus of control, a
plausible candidate to take responsibility for a problem,
or a point of leverage to fix a problem.”169 For this reason,
causal politics invites simplification. Where experts see
complex causal processes, “real-world politics” “searches
for immediate and simple causes.”170
The appeal of the subsidy theory was that it explained the tax treatment of deferred compensation in
“immediate and simple” terms that had clear policy
implications. The theory detached undertaxation from
the complex problem of accommodating the income tax
to the business practices of private-sector employers.171
Instead, the theory depicted undertaxation as the
product of an intentional decision by lawmakers to
give something to private-sector actors. The implications were that employers with a retirement plan were
spending government funds and that government had a
claim on those funds. For example, when Treasury
proposed coverage rules for pension plans in 1942, Randolph Paul explained that “the purpose” of the proposed
rules was “to prevent the subsidy from being used only
in behalf of the higher salaried, key employees.”172
Likewise, Adrian DeWind, a lawyer in the Office of the
Tax Legislative Counsel, explained in 1944 that “[t]he
propriety of setting up a tax provision which makes the
Government so large a partner in the pursuit of private
corporate interests and the personal interests of covered
employees must depend to a great extent upon the degree
to which the serving of the special interests coincides with
the general national interest.”173
These origins suggest the deficiencies of the subsidy
theory as an account of the reasons lawmakers created
the basic tax treatment of deferred compensation. As
Deborah Stone observes, “Purpose must always be
demonstrated with evidence of the actor ’s wishes o r
motives, apart from the effects of his actions.”174 The
Treasury officials who developed the tax-subsidy
theory were not concerned with the “wishes or motives” that led lawmakers to develop special rules for
pension trusts. Instead, they wished to justify policy
changes to regulate the undertaxation these rules
produced. In light of this political and rhetorical goal,
it is understandable that the tax-subsidy theory
neglected the broader problem — nonintegration —
that led lawmakers to adopt and to maintain special
tax rules for defined-benefit pension plans.
168

Id. at 283.
Id. at 289.
170
Id. See also R. Douglas Arnold, The Logic of Congressional
Action 18-25 (1990).
171
The “marriage penalty” involves a similar logic. See
Michael J. Graetz, The Decline [and Fall?] of the Income Tax
29-41, 294 n. 6 (1997); Gene Steuerle, “How Marriage Penalties Arise,” Tax Notes, Mar. 23, 1998, p. 1559.
172
Revenue Revision of 1942, supra note 166, at 2407.
173
DeWind, “Special Wartime and Other Problems,” supra
note 166, at 90.
174
See Stone, supra note 167, at 290.
169

1319

